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Introduction: Virtue Ethics 
There are two basic kinds of ethical judgments.The first has to 
do with duty and obligation. For example: "Thou shalt not kill, lie 
or steal." "You should help your brother pay off his debts." These 
judgments often uphold minimal standards of conduct and (partly 
for that reason) assert or imply a moral 'ought.' The second kind 
of judgment focuses on human excellence and the good life. These 
judgments employ as their most general terms "happiness," 
"excellence" and perhaps "flourishing" (in addition to "the good 
life"). For example: "Happiness requires activity and not mere 
passive consumption." "The good life includes pleasure, friendship, 
intellectual development and physical health." All ethical judgments 
are either examples or combinations of these two general types. 
The first contention of this paper is that we must distinguish them 
and not try to understand the one as a special case of the other. 
Ethical theories may be usefully divided into two main types, 
deontological or eudaimonist, based on whether they take one or 
the other of these kinds of judgments as primary.1 In the main, 
ancient ethical theories were eudaimonist in both form and content 
(in the kinds of judgments and terms they took as primary and in 
the questions they spent the most time investigating) while most 
modern ethical theories have been deontological, again in both form 
and content. The second contention of this paper is that neither 
1 These terms come from the Greek words for necessity and obligation, and 
happiness, respectively. David Heyd describes this as a difference between 
deontological and axiological theories (Supererogation: Its status in ethical theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 36). Charles Larmore makes a 
similar distinction, following Sidgwick ('The Right and the Good," Philosophia 
20(1990): 15). 
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type of theory should hold prominence over the other, nor should 
we subsume them under some more encompassing ethical theory.2 
The resurgence of "virtue ethics" in the past fifteen years has 
been tied to a number of disparate projects and positions? In my 
view, its most important consequence has been to reopen Aristotle's 
and Augustine's central question — What is the good life and how 
can we achieve it? — as a major question in philosophical ethics. 
In reasserting the importance of eudaimonist judgments concerning 
our flourishing, excellence and happiness, virtue ethics reclaims 
this neglected half of our ethical lives for intelligent consideration. 
For many contemporary ethicists the most important difference 
between virtue ethics and its Kantian and utilitarian counterparts is 
that virtue ethics is "agent-centered" rather than "act-centered"; 
this emphasis has led some to develop virtue ethics primarily as a 
"character ethics." 4 Whether or not this clarifies or completes 
2 Many readers will prefer to divide ethical theories into three basic types 
—eudaimonist, deontological and utilitarian— and there are other legitimate 
typologies. However, twentieth-century moral theory has been preoccupied with 
the nature and possibility of "the moral ought," and to a lesser extent with a detailed 
specification of particular duties. It has also neglected questions concerning human 
excellence and flourishing. In this sense, modern moral theory has been essentially 
deontological. 
3 These have included rejecting the primacy of meta-ethics and the possibility 
of a moral calculus, and returning to the careful description of concrete moral 
experience (Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in 
Greek Tragedy and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 
299-306;); developing a communitarian ethics which limits individual rights where 
these conflict with the common good (Charles Taylor, "Atomism," in Taylor, 
Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1985), 187-210); questioning the scope and importance of deontological moral 
claims (Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1981), 23-26, 38-39); and turning from a universalist to an historicist moral 
theorizing (Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1984), 265-72). Good summaries of main trends are Roger 
Crisp, "Modern Moral Philosophy and the Virtues," in Crisp (ed.), How Should 
One Live? Essays on the Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 1-18; 
and Gregory Trianosky, "What is Virtue Ethics All About?," American 
Philosophical Quarterly 27 (1990): 335-344. 
4 Among many examples see Larry Blum Moral Perception and Particularity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 148-149; Nancy Sherman, The 
Fabric of Character: Aristotle's Theory of Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989), 1-2; David Norton, "Moral Minimalism and the Development of Moral 
VIRTUE ETHICS (NOT TOO) SIMPLIFED 51 
deontological ethics, it provides a mistaken view of eudaimonist 
ethics, which does not focus narrowly on character. Rather, 
eudaimonist ethics judges the people we are and the lives we lead. 
In the end, a comprehensive account of the good life must consider 
our actions, our selves and our personal achievements.5 
The term 'virtue ethics' can also mislead if it is taken to mean 
an exclusive focus on "the virtues": enduring character traits such 
as courage and moderation which foster successful achievement 
and help make a person a good person. Eudaimonist ethics is 
concerned with such character traits, but only as part of a conception 
of the good, successful or happy life. This is the more basic 
consideration and discussions of the virtues make no sense apart 
from it.6 
Many contemporary ethicists mistakenly specify the virtues as 
stable dispositions to act according to duty.7 This is in line with 
modern English usage, as the term 'virtue' has taken on a moralistic 
sense. Eudaimonist ethical theory, however, neither equates the good 
life and the dutiful life nor defines the virtues narrowly in terms of 
dispositions to act morally. For we reckon physical, intellectual 
and psychological qualities as virtues if they typically help people 
to live well and achieve excellence: to create great works of art or 
Character." in Peter French et al. (eds.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume 
XIII: Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1988), 180: and Guy Axtell, "Recent Work in Virtue Epistemology," 
American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (1997): 2. 
5 As Amartya Sen notes, it is not clear that reason demands that we privilege 
either character or personal achievement in judging human excellence (The 
Standard of Living (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1987), 27-28). 
6 Julia Annas, The Morality of Happiness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993)46. 
7 Annas. Morality, 49-52, and the following, all in French et al.. Midwest Studies 
R.B. Brandt, "The Structure of Virtue," 64: Martha Nussbaum. "Non-Relative 
Virtues." 35: Amelie Rorty, "Virtues and Their Vicissitudes," 137-38. Kant specifies 
such a moralistic and inward, intentionalist understanding of 'virtue' in a very 
pure form: "virtue is . . . the moral strength of a man's will in fulfilling his duty ." 
(Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue: Part II of The Metaphysic of Morals (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), 66. For a defense of this Kantian 
conception of virtue see Onora O'Neill,"Kant* s Virtues," in Crisp, pp. 77-97. For 
a critique see Walter Schaller, "Are Virtues No More Than Dispositions to Obey 
Moral Rules?" Philosophia 20(1990): 195-207. 
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scholarship, for example, build successful careers or businesses, 
raise strong and loving families. Such achievements are not typically 
considered moral (in our restricted modern sense) or matters of 
duty. Yet they exemplify human goodness and excellence. 
The virtue ethics revival points the way towards a better 
philosophical ethics. Like our ancient predecessors, modern ethical 
philosophers should attempt to give good advice to those aspiring 
to live well. But we are more likely to do so if we work to clarify 
and improve our and their eudaimonist judgments. Virtue ethics 
will have little use as a new way of dealing with the meta-ethical 
issues which have bedeviled twentieth-century philosophy or as a 
new way to speak about moral goodness and other essentially 
deontological concerns. It sneaks to a different and neglected topic: 
human excellence and flourishing.8 
Deontological and Eudaimonist Judgments 
I began by stating that deontological and eudaimonist judgments 
should be carefully distinguished. Of course, ethical decisions 
involve both kinds of judgments, so at some point they must be 
related, in thought and in action. But these judgments articulate 
different aspects of our ethical situation, and previous attempts at 
comprehensive ethical theories have often mischaracterized one 
type of judgment in an effort to legitimize the other. For these 
reasons we should first carefully characterize the two kinds of 
8 The phrase "enlightened self-interest" best defines the scope of a properly 
conceived eudaimonist ethics. Perhaps only a minority of writers on "virtue ethics" 
support a eudaimonist ethics in this sense. Among them see Charles Taylor, "The 
Diversity of Goods" and Sabina Lovibond, "Realism and Imagination in Ethics," 
both in Stanley Clarke and Evan Simpson (eds.), Ami-Theory in Ethics and Moral 
Conservatism (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989); and Richard 
Taylor, "Ancient Wisdom and Modern Folly," in French et al.. Midwest Studies. 
However, the majority of the authors in these two representative collections are 
either critics of eudaimonist ethics or formal virtue ethicists who are in substance 
deontologists. Such for example is Iris Murdoch, the author of The Sovereignty of 
Good, who writes that "in the moral life the enemy is the fat relentless ego." 
(quoted by Lovibond, 270). 
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judgments, keeping an open mind as to how far they may be 
harmonized and a healthy skepticism regarding all comprehensive 
theories. 
Consider an environmental example. Jim owns a 40-acre second 
growth forest as part of his Wisconsin farm. It is a beautiful forest 
with a brook running through it which Jim, his father and his own 
sons have often fished. It has been the scene of family walks, 
bird watching expeditions and courtships. It also has been the source 
for the family's firewood, and of extra income when sections have 
been cut from time to time. Now Jim has an offer from a regional 
timber buyer for the trees. The money, of course, would come in 
handy. He has a decision to make. 
What might he believe his duties are in this case? Certainly the 
duty to provide for his family's well-being; perhaps also to protect 
the forest; perhaps to keep the farmstead in the family. He might 
feel as if he "ought" to do all of these things. These "oughts" limit 
his choices. Such duties mean that he might not get to do what he 
wants to do — whether he wants to sell the trees or preserve them. 
What is in his "enlightened self interest"? Here he will consider 
what he could buy with the money from the sale, but also the various 
activities made possible by living next to a beautiful forest. He 
will consider the happiness of his family as it would be affected by 
one course of action or another other, and perhaps also the effects 
on the farmstead itself, both the forest and the adjoining lands 
(perhaps the forest stands serve to buffer fields from floods and 
erosion). For these other entities, too, may flourish or decline. 9 All 
these considerations might play a part in his judgments on the 
advisability of one course of action or another. 
Clearly there is one decision to be made here and one family, 
one farm and one forest (not to say that there are only two choices: 
perhaps the 40-acres could be harvested in part; harvested in 
different ways, etc.) . Jim's deontological and eudaimonist 
judgments must both be grounded in the nature of the entities 
9 Judgments concerning forest health or preserving biodiversity only refer to 
Jim's enlightened self-interest on an expansive definition of both 'enlightened' 
and 'self-interest.' See Arne Naess. Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline 
of an Ecosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1989). 8-9. 
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concerned and his relationships to them. But the key point is this: 
he cannot define his duties in terms of his enlightened self-interest 
or vice versa. 
Duties cannot be defined in terms of enlightened self-interest. 
For our duties are not merely to ourselves but to other beings, and 
their good sometimes conflicts with our own. Jim may come to the 
conclusion that the course of action which will lead to his own 
happiness or self-development is to sell the trees and use the money 
to go to college or buy a new business. Nevertheless he may have 
a duty to protect them, based on their intrinsic value. He may, 
contrarily, decide that his enlightened self-interest dictates 
protecting the trees and enjoying them in his old accustomed ways. 
Nevertheless, he may have a duty to sell them in order to support 
his family. We cannot assume that our self-interest will harmonize 
with our duties towards others, any more than we can assume they 
will conflict. 
To deny this is to fail to understand the nature of duty. In 
"Resistance to Civil Government," Thoreau writes that we must 
consider 
those cases to which the rule of expediency does 
not apply, in which a people, as well as an 
individual, must do justice, cost what it may. If I 
have unjustly wrested a plank from a drowning 
man, I must restore it to him though I drown myself 
. . . he that would save his life, in such a case, shall 
lose it. 10 
The key point here is that duty overrides expediency and self-
interest, by its very definition.This is true whether or not duty ever 
calls for the absolute sacrifice of one's life. It holds regardless of 
how often duty and expediency do, in fact, conflict. (It also holds 
whether or not Thoreau is right in this case, concerning a general 
1 0 Thoreau, Reform Papers (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), 68. 
"He that would save his l i f e . . . shall lose it" refers to Luke 9:24. While the word 
'duty' does not occur in the passage quoted, the previous paragraph mentions 
"this duty . . . for honest men to rebel and revolutionize." 
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duty to resist a government which denies human rights by protecting 
slavery and promoting foreign aggression.) 
On the other hand, enlightened self-interest cannot be defined 
by our duties. Even if we exhaustively specified Jim's duties to 
himself, his family, his neighbors and his forest, we would not have 
specified his enlightened self-interest. For assuming that he is in 
the enviable position of having enough money to support his family 
without selling the trees and leaving open the question of whether 
he has a duty to protect the trees for their own sakes, the question 
remains: what would be in his best interest? And if we assume that 
he decides not to sell or harvest the trees, the question remains: 
how may he best enjoy the forest?! l Whether the answer involves 
hunting, fishing and skylarking, or ecological study, or painting 
and composing poetry, it is clear that none of these activities are 
duties. Still less can their proper pursuit be explicated in terms of 
duty. To assume that the best human life is the most dutiful life is 
to forget that we have freedom as well as constraint in our ethical 
decisions, legitimate self-interest as well as duties to others, and 
possibilities for excellence as well as basic injunctions to help and 
not harm. 1 2 
" Similarly, if Jim accepts a duty to protect the forest, the question of how best 
to protect it remains. This, once again, involves an ef fort to understand the nature 
and excellence of the forest. 
1 2 Just as we cannot understand duty in terms of enlightened self-interest or vice 
versa, so we cannot "reduce," define or explain deontological ethical concepts in 
terms of eudaimonist concepts or vice versa. Many philosophers have made such 
attempts: for example, Jorge Garcia holds that "certain virtue concepts are more 
basic than major deontic concepts" and that "understanding right and wrong action 
in terms of certain virtue concepts helps us toward understanding and defending 
traditional Western morality." ("The Primacy of the Virtuous," Philosophia 20 
(1990): 69) I see little value in such reductive attempts. Our concepts of duty . law 
and responsibility, on the one hand, and happiness, excellence and goodness, on 
the other, are of disparate provenience and often serve dif ferent purposes. 
'Duty' may be understood by analogy with man-made laws. We must follow 
these, or we will be compelled to do so and punished if we do not. From this we 
move to the idea of a moral law, which holds even in the absence of an obvious 
law-giver, even in the absence of coercion, even if we are not worried about being 
found out and punished for breaking it. The moral law holds, regardless of.... The 
concept of 'goodness,' on the other hand, is used to describe physical entities, 
both biological organisms and human artifacts. Or ganisms flourish or succeed in 
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However, this leaves Jim with the problem of acting on the 
basis of these two different sorts of judgments, and the problem 
becomes acute when they push him in opposite directions. For 
instance, he might come to believe that duty demands that he 
preserve the trees, while his own best interest involves selling them. 
Conversely, he might come to believe that he has a duty to his 
family to sell the trees (let us say his two children need the money 
in order to go to college), while his own happiness and the health 
of the land dictate that he preserve them. How might he resolve 
such dilemmas? 
I believe we must leave open the possibility that these will be 
genuine dilemmas, resolvable in action but not in reason. There 
may be no best choice here, but rather a number of equally 
choiceworthy possibilities. Certainly choice often involves picking 
among mutually exclusive possibilities or making trade-offs 
between scarce goods. Jim might bow to paternal duty and cut the 
trees for the sake of his children's education —but with the 
understanding that his own happiness will suffer. Or he may believe 
his own happiness and the preservation of the farm dictate 
preserving the trees, and do so —but recognize that he is failing to 
perform a duty which his children have a right to demand that he 
perform. 
But it is important to realize that even if this is true in Jim's 
case, that is not the equivalent of saying "anything goes" or asserting 
that all choices are equally good. For we must distinguish cases 
where duty overrides enlightened self-interest, or vice versa, from 
cases where one or both are overridden by thoughdessness or mere 
swinishness. It is not the same case if Jim sells his trees without a 
particular environments; artifacts further their makers' purposes more or less well. 
From this we move to the idea of ethical goodness, the goodness of human beings. 
We are another kind of thing in the world (albeit a kind of thing in which we are 
unusually interested, which is unusually variable in its activities and purposes, 
and which transforms the context in which it understands itself). Ethical goodness 
is the goodness of human beings in their proper context, properly described, but 
just what that proper context and description is .... We gain nothing by 
reconceptualizing duty in terms of goodness or vice versa. Nor can we, by mere 
wordplay, reconcile those situations where duty and happiness, or duty and the 
pursuit of excellence, conflict. 
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thought as to what they have meant to him and his family, or their 
role in preventing disastrous floods on his farm. Nor is it the same 
case if he sells them in order to buy a new Lexus, pay off his 
gambling debts, or "cover each one of his dollars with another." 1 3 
In none of these cases can we dignify his actions with the name of 
acting from duty or from enlightened self-interest. 
Furthermore, duty and enlightened self-interest often coincide. 
It may be that the money Jim would get from selling his trees would 
not compensate him for the pleasure, health benefits, scientific 
knowledge, poetic inspiration and cherished associations that he 
would forego if the forest disappeared; and that the intrinsic value 
of the forest and its many inhabitants places a duty on him not to 
harm them unnecessarily. Still, we may fail to do right in these 
cases, as Thoreau put it, "through mere ignorance and mistake," 
through acting complacently in "the ruts of tradition and 
conformity," or through "gross feeding": the "betrayal" of our 
health, ideals and better selves by our "vast abdomens." 1 4 Here 
both deontological and eudaimonist judgments will condemn us. 
Balancing the Two Basic Types of Ethical Judgments 
In the end, it might seem possible to subsume deontological 
and eudaimonist judgments under a single ethical framework. 
Deontological moral theories rest on a belief in the intrinsic value 
or moral considerability of human beings (minority view: some 
non-human beings, too) an egalitarian sense of "fairness" (the moral 
law both binds and protects all human beings) and a presumption 
in favor of rationality and consistency (why treat other people 
differently than you would yourself want to be treated? why treat 
one group of human beings differently than another group, when 
we are essentially the same?). 
Eudaimonist theories rest partly on the same basis. They too 
appeal to rationality and consistency, presupposing that we may 
rationally decide between possible goals and organize our lives so 
1 3 Thoreau, Waiden (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), 294. 
IM bid. .6:323:215. 
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as to more efficiently pursue them. They too presuppose human 
dignity and importance (else why enjoin the pursuit of excellence?). 
But eudaimonist judgments only make sense given the inegalitarian 
proposition that some lives and some people are better than others. 
Hence eudaimonist ethical theories are essentially inegalitarian. 
This may be the main difference between deontological and 
eudaimonist ethics. 15 But perhaps these conflicting intuitions 
concerning human equality can be rationally adjudicated. For 
(restricting our scrutiny to human beings) we can at least imagine 
a deontological theory which recognizes differences in the worth 
of human beings and hence assigns different duties and rights to 
individuals. In fact, we do not demand the standard duties from 
those who cannot perform them, while we sometimes do strip 
individuals of their rights. For example, we do not expect the 
mentally retarded to vote or blame them if they do not do so, while 
convicts in the U.S.A. forfeit their right to vote. On the other side 
of the divide, a eudaimonist ethics might recognize a widespread 
human excellence or potential for excellence, which would ground 
our basic, negative duties in a respect for human nature. We 
acknowledge the superior excellence of a Shakespeare or Newton, 
but the basic abilities to write and to reason are impressive in 
themselves, and these are almost universally distributed among us.16 
A consideration of human ends might further bridge the gap 
between deontological and eudaimonist judgments. Aristotle 
plausibly centers his eudaimonist ethics on a discussion of the final 
or chief human end, while Kant formulates one version of the 
categorical imperative as follows: "Act in such a way that you 
always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person 
of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time 
as an end ." 1 7 We could reformulate this to include Aristotle's 
1 5 If so, it represents a genuine schizophrenia in our common-sense ethical beliefs. 
For we both believe and disbelieve in human equality. 
1 6 Alternatively, a eudaimonist theory might minimize our differences. Some 
philosophers have written that happiness consists in a full belly and a content 
mind, and that human achievements are transient and of little account. On this 
view, there is little difference in individual excellence and little purpose in attending 
to that difference. 
1 7 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals (New Yortf: Harper and Row, 
1964), 96. 
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injunction to strive for happiness and personal excellence, and to 
leave open the possibility of treating refractory humans with less 
respect and some non-human beings with more respect, thus: 
Act in such a way that you always treat any being, 
whether yourself or another, never simply as a 
means, but always at the same time as an end, to 
the extent that it deserves such treatment. Further, 
if this being holds within itself the seeds of a better 
existence, act whenever possible so as to further 
its improvement.! 8 
With this reformulation in mind, consider the following three 
injunctions: 
* Act rationally and consistently! 
* Respect human and non-human nature to the 
extent that they merit it! 
* Consider your own ends and the ends of those 
entities you affect! 
Do they suggest a complete ethics which correctly balances our 
two basic types of ethical judgment? Consider Jim once again, 
deciding whether to sell his 40-acre forest. 
He feels, let us assume, a duty to protect his trees, a duty to 
support his family and a duty to himself to develop his higher 
capabilities. If he considers the nature of the entities affected by 
his actions, this both grounds his duties (yes, his trees and his sons 
have intrinsic value, irrespective of his feelings towards them and 
their usefulness to him) and clarifies them (perhaps duty does not 
demand that he never cut a tree, but rather that he not cut them all 
at once; perhaps duty demands that he provide enough money for 
the family to live on, but not more than this). Such consideration 
1 8 This leaves open the possibility of assigning a diminished moral status to 
human beings who debase themselves. On a Kantian view this undermines the 
universality of the categorical imperative and thus undermines its status as 
categorical. 
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of the nature and ends of those beings affected by his decision may 
dissolve what appeared to be a clash of duties, or a clash between 
duty and happiness. Perhaps he sells the trees, but insists that the 
loggers leave a buffer zone around the brook and leave one-third 
of all large trees standing. This may be sufficient both to protect 
the forest and to preserve those activities within it which are 
necessary to his happiness (fishing in the brook, birdwatching along 
the paths and in the clearings). Or perhaps he does not sell the 
trees, reasoning that his family does not need the money in order to 
pursue important or legitimate ends. "Let the kids continue to drive 
the old Volvo," he might say. "We already have enough money to 
send them to college, and they will miss the forest as much as I." 
Such considerations may solve Jim's problems, but they may 
not. For he might need to sacrifice his own happiness and the good 
of the forest to support his children, or sacrifice his children's 
interests in order to preserve his own happiness and the forest. 
Conflicts between our various duties, between duty and happiness, 
and between duty and the pursuit of excel lence, are real . 
Consideration of the three general injunctions above can make such 
conflicts explicit. But neither this nor any other general framework 
leads to a definitive balancing of the opposing factors that are 
typically manifested in the split between our judgments concerning 
duty and our judgments concerning happiness and personal 
excellence. 
The conflict over egalitarianism has already been mentioned. 
Look as deeply into human and forest nature as he wishes, into the 
demands of reason, and into the various ends and excellences of 
all concerned, these do not specify for Jim a single, rational position 
which precisely balances the interests of all parties affected by his 
decisions. For example, he may have to choose whether to spend 
the money earned from a timber sale on expensive cello lessons 
for his gifted daughter Kim or on classes at a local community 
college for his less gifted son Tim. The latter course will help insure 
that Tim will be able to support himself and live a comfortable life. 
But the former may allow Kim to develop into a great performer. I 
do not see a principled way of deciding in this case . 1 9 
1 9 Of course it is a different story if it is a question of starving Tim in order for 
Kim to have cello lessons. Perhaps the most perspicuous way to make the point is 
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Or assume that the forest can be divided into three equal areas. 
Area A is the most spectacular of the three, both in terms of 
harboring several endangered and unique plant communities, in 
the size and beauty of its trees, and in terms of harvestable timber. 
Areas B and C are less beautiful, unique and biologically rich, and 
together contain only as much timber as area A alone. Let's say 
that Jim's crops have done poorly and he must sell half the timber 
on his forest. Which areas should he sell? if he saves the more 
excellent area A then he sacrifices the less excellent, but more 
extensive and still valuable, areas B and C. It is a toss-up. 
Consider next the conflict over ethical egoism. Popular thought 
tends to equate morality with selflessness and altruism. When 
modern deontological theories do not do so, they usually advocate 
equal t reatment for all morally considerable individuals . 
Eudaimonist theories, contrarily, begin from a presumption of 
justified self-interest: our main concern is and should be with our 
own happiness and personal excellence. It is not clear that this marks 
an essential difference between deontological and eudaimonist 
ethical theories. 2 0 But be that as it may, it certainly marks an area 
of contention within moral thought. 
Here once again, our more encompassing framework does not 
fully resolve this conflict. Can Jim legitimately place his own 
happiness above that of his children in deciding whether to sell his 
trees? It makes a difference that he owns them, and that his sons 
will grow up and have the chance to buy their own farms and 
manage them to suit themselves. Still, we would judge Jim selfish 
if he gave no weight to the interests of his own family members or 
his neighbors (perhaps the forest helps protect their lands from 
flooding). Personal excellence and happiness are best served, often, 
by minding one's own business; duty, by placing one's own interests 
on a par with others'. But when these interests conflict, it is difficult 
to assume a fixed amount of money to support the two children and to ask whether 
it must be divided equally. Or. if the closeness of the family bond seems to demand 
absolute fairness and equality, imagine a school board considering whether to 
allocate extra funds for gifted students. 
2 0 Julia Annas argues that "the fact that I aim at my own final end makes ancient 
ethics formally agent-centered or self-centered. but does not make it self-centered 
in content." (Morality, 223; ibid., 322-25) 
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to judge between them, and no comparison of our own needs and 
desires with those of others will resolve this conflict. Of course, all 
these interests can be subordinated in an effort to promote common 
goals and projects. But that they should be so subordinated is a 
further, and frequently unjustified, assumption. 
Consider next the conflict over the scope and force of ethical 
judgments. Because deontological theories tend, following Kant, 
to conceptualize ethical duties as universal and categorically 
binding, they tend also to limit their number and scope.This seems 
reasonable, because if such duties proliferated too broadly, moral 
injunctions would both lose some of their unique force, and 
improperly and unnecessarily crowd our lives with their "thou 
shalts" and "thou shalt nots." In eudaimonist theories, contrarily, 
judgments of excellence are both broader in scope and lesser in 
force. For if "ought implies can" and the deontologist's "ought" 
implies "should," the eudaimonist's "good" does not necessarily 
imply either. We often recognize excellence while doubting that it 
is our duty to achieve such excellence. Jim might be a better father 
if he took his son fishing or a better naturalist if he went 
birdwatching at 6 a.m. rather than 9:30 (and if a better father or 
naturalist, then a better person). Nevertheless it is not his duty to 
do either. Indeed, we recognize excellences beyond anything we 
could personally achieve, so that it could never be our duty to 
achieve them. Jim can recognize the marks of genius in the Audubon 
prints and Ansel Adams photographs at the art museum in the state 
capitol, even though he will never duplicate their results in his own 
efforts. 
Arguably, individuals have a general duty of self-improvement 
and each moment provides us with opportunities to improve. Yet 
we may justifiably decline to fight a continual war of self-
improvement.2l On one view, to call something a duty is to refer to 
minimum standards and mark off areas of choice where we must 
2 1 Even Thoreau's Waiden, with its repeated injunctions to strive! has its lazier 
moods: "Sometimes in a summer morning, having taken my accustomed bath. I 
sat in my sunny doorway from sunrise till noon, rapt in revery . . . A man must 
find his occasions in himself. . . The natural day is very calm, and will hardly 
reprove his indolence.'' (111-12) 
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act in certain ways. Yet despite many efforts, there is no accepted 
account of the scope and limits of our duties, understood as ethical 
minima. Jim has a duty to provide for his children's food and basic 
education, and he goes beyond the call of duty if he makes time 
every day to help them with their homework or walk with them in 
the woods. He is then an excellent father. Yet where duty leaves off 
and altruism or excellence begins is unclear. Similarly, it is morally 
arbitrary whether Jim will spend this particular hot summer 
afternoon fixing fences, keying out rare plants or studying Italian 
— in short, improving his opportunities — or simply lay down by 
the brook and catch some zzzs. Nevertheless if Jim spent most of 
his time snoozing, he would fail in his duty to develop his talents. 
An individual's positions on these three issues — egalitarianism, 
egoism, and ethical striving — are important in specifying his or 
her personal ethics. Yet they defy precise and non-arbitrary answers, 
in the sense that all rational beings would or should agree and act 
similarly if given similar choices. Since radically opposed positions 
on these issues are typically incorporated into the deontological/ 
eudaimonist split, we must be careful not to arbitrarily resolve these 
questions through privileging one or the other kind of theory.22 
And since resolving these issues is part of what we look for in an 
ethical theory, we should be doubly on our guard. False resolutions 
are possible, as when moralists write off all self-interest as 
selfishness, or call non-moral excellence and worldly achievement 
unimportant, being irrelevant to a basic moral considerability. 
Conclusion: Limits to a Narrative Resolution 
The great hope remains that our interests and the interests of 
others, our duties and our efforts to live well, might be incorporated 
into a single ethical vision. And so they can be. Jim may tell himself 
a story about his life and the life of his family on the farm which 
2 2 To reiterate: deontology is typically egalitarian, attacks human egotism, and 
distinguishes a realm of moral decisions and actions from a realm of non-moral 
decisions and actions. Eudaimonism is typically inegalitarian, formally and 
sometimes substantially egoistic, and sees all human life and activity as a matter 
of better or worse. 
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Stretches back into the past and on into the future; incorporates 
basic economic production and poetry, study and skylarking; 
includes his own interests and the interests of his family, his 
neighbors and the land. His place within this story specifies both 
obligations and opportunities. Jim's duties are primarily to entities, 
human and non-human, which play useful roles in the life of the 
farm (and utility should not be narrowly defined as economic 
utility). His sacrifices to duty might be seen as necessary to preserve 
the life of the farm itself. If this frustrates his own proximate ends, 
it still furthers the ends of the larger, ongoing concern: preserving 
the farm's long-term productivity, for example. Jim might sacrifice 
for the rising generation, but they in their turn will run the farm. 
This should further his own long-term happiness, providing Jim a 
place to retire, surrounded by grandchildren and the fields and 
forests he has known, all protected and cared for into the foreseeable 
future .23 
Similarly, any happiness or personal excellence made possible 
by life on the farm is obviously a communal creation, and "living 
well" might plausibly define the most general goal of the farm as 
an ongoing entity. This involves basic economic productivity (with 
everyone pitching in, from the children doing their chores to 
earthworms turning the soil) and the simple enjoyments of picking 
huckleberries and swimming in the brook. It can also involve 
studying nature and singing of its beauty. Thus might the human 
generations of J im's family " improve" the landscape and 
themselves, and tell the farm's stories as they write their own story 
on the land. (And if the farm produced no scientists or poets, and 
no spark of science or poetry in its average members, they would 
hardly be living human lives —anymore than if the farm produced 
generations of people with no compassion or with no ability to 
enjoy the pleasures of a picnic by the brook.) Jim may act on the 
basis of this story and define his roles as father, farmer and fisherman 
within it. In this way, his deontological and eudaimonist judgments 
may be deepened, clarified, and perhaps reconciled. 
2 3 Aristotle briefly discusses a sense in which an individual* s happiness may be 
connected to his descendants' well-being in Ethics, book 1, chapter 10. Similarly 
our happiness may be connected to projects lasting beyond our death. 
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A narrative focus lends some support to ethical objectivism. 
Given human nature and that Nature we are situated in, we cannot 
tell just any story about our career within it. Given our particular 
(sometimes originally free or arbitrary) commitments to certain 
people, places and social roles, we cannot tell just any story about 
our personal success or failure. Jim cannot tell a coherent story 
about his life as a compassionate man who beats his wife and 
children. He cannot tell an accurate story about his life as a 
knowledgeable and careful land steward whose topsoil washes 
down the brook during the spring floods. We may say: "Jim has a 
duty not to abandon his children or cause excessive topsoil erosion. 
To do so is morally wrong." We may say: "Jim cannot find happiness 
or achieve excellence outside of certain general roles such as 'father' 
or 'knowledgeable resident of a place.' Strong cases can be made 
for these judgments. 2 4 
Still, even given a respect for facts and an honest attempt to 
come to grips with them, Jim's life on the farm supports a variety 
of interpretations. The story that Jim tells himself will incorporate 
his own limited wit and limitless whim. But even assuming, per 
impossibile, omniscience and perfect objectivity in the judge, ethical 
judgments based upon Jim's success or failure in furthering his 
own ends or the ends of an intergenerational endeavor known as 
"the farm" will be somewhat indeterminate. Because the 
components of a good human life — pleasure, health, freedom, 
friendship, knowledge, a rich experience, personal achievement, 
etc.— cannot be rank-ordered, specification of Jim's highest good 
cannot be e x a c t s Because the farm is a complex whole, 
incorporating the many stories of Jim's family members and its 
non-human residents, specification of its good is difficult (as is 
2 4 AJasdair Macintyre has emphasized the importance of narrative to virtue ethics, 
correctly insisting that no moral or scientific knowledge, and no persuasive 
combination of the two, can completely take the place of story-telling in clarifying 
our ethical judgments. Macintyre clearly hopes that placing individuals' stories 
within the context of larger, more important stories will both clarify the meaning 
of their lives and actions, and allow for an objectively correct moral evaluation of 
them (After Virtue. 121-130; Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: 
Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press. 1990), 80; 144). 
2 5 Charles Taylor, "The Diversity of Goods." 223-240. 
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telling its story). Finally, because the entities that make up the farm 
are valuable in their own right, assertions that "the good of the 
farm" should trump Jim's interests, his son's interests, or the forest's 
interests, are always open to question. 
The facts admit of varied interpretations, yet the particular story 
told defines the ends of the activities it describes. The limits of 
narrative objectivity thus illustrate the limited objectivity of any 
teleological ethical theory. It remains possible to set Jim's life on 
the farm in still larger frameworks, locating its point and value in 
something grander: the settlement of the west; the triumph of man 
over nature; the progress of democracy. Jim himself might explain 
and justify some of his actions in terms of his role in such important 
historical movements. Certainly our actions are often tied in to 
projects which are larger and more important than ourselves: 
whether raising a family, building a community center or 
contributing to the progress of knowledge. But to recognize this is 
to once again admit the enormous complexity and indeterminacy 
created by the existence of interweaving stories at a variety of levels. 
For we legitimately refuse to locate the full meaning and value of 
Jim's life and his little farm in the roles they play in larger historical 
movements (just as we earlier refused to locate the value of Jim's 
life solely in terms of furthering the good of "the farm"). 
For example, increased settlement within the county might 
dictate condemning Jim's farm and damming the brook to create a 
reservoir, to insure an adequate water supply. Assuming that 
'settlement' means increased population and that we value such 
settlement above all else, there is nothing wrong with uprooting 
Jim's family from their farm: further settlement now demands it. 
But against this, I believe that the story he and his family have 
written upon the land demands respect and restraint from the 
community. An individual's particular projects have a value 
independent of whether they help or hinder the broad social changes 
going on around them. More generally, there remain genuine 
dilemmas in balancing public and private interests. Because grand 
narratives and teleological ethical schemes are more likely to ignore 
particulars than to resolve conflicts between the general and the 
particular, they should be treated with skepticism. Jim's great-
grandfather might not have doubted that the imperatives of 
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settlement demanded the removal of the Sioux; Jim might think 
differently as a survey crew moves onto his land and the county 
sheriff hands him an eviction notice. 
Furthermore, even if we grant a preponderant importance to 
general projects and ends, what they demand of us is somewhat 
uncertain. We value settlement and honor the pioneers, but what 
constitutes proper settlement? Do we understand Jim's great-
grandfather's clearing the primeval forest and planting his first crop 
as the beginning of a new harmony between humanity and nature, 
or of the taming and control of nature in the service of increased 
wealth? Let us assume that the past hundred years of white 
settlement strongly support one or the other of these interpretations: 
that does not prove that we should continue along this path. Perhaps 
it was never a good path; perhaps it was good once and is so no 
longer; perhaps a finer settlement is possible. Whether the rest of 
the county is being paved over for condominiums or the land is 
reverting to forest as agriculture becomes less profitable, that is 
merely what is happening now, not necessarily what is best. Jim 
must decide whether to buck these trends or accommodate himself 
to them. It is his life, after all. It is his story. 
There is an element of uncertainty here, but also of choice. 
Jim's family's settiement is an instantiation of Settlement. It is an 
interpretation of this grand theme with its own meaning, a story 
with its own excellence or mediocrity. Even if a more consistent 
and encompassing teleological ethics was convincing, we might 
willfully reject it, given the value we place on human freedom. In 
any event, there is no single, encompassing end in which human 
nature or Nature find their true completion, and which clearly 
specifies a course of action which we are obliged to follow in reason. 
Thus even if narrative seems a promising route for reconciling duty 
and the pursuit of excellence, and our individual and communal 
projects, the objectivity of any accompanying teleological ethical 
theory will be limited. Still, we will tell stories about our lives. Our 
ethical judgments do find a sort of resolution in the stories we tell 
and the stories we live. 
